Information can kill

Recent advances in understanding links between genes and the susceptibility to particular diseases have considerably increased the scope for predictive diagnosis. Methods. We analyse how the introduc- tion of predictive diagnosis affects patients�decisions to undergo medical screenings relying on a �rational choice�model. Findings. We show that predictive diagnosis can increase the number of fatalities from a deadly disease. Interpretation. Our result shows the necessity of careful further analysis and debate about the pros and cons of predictive diagnosis and the publication of medical research in general

Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.tax incidence;monopoly;Bertrand competition;experiment

Taxation and Market Power

We analyze the incidence and welfare e¤ects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We nd, in line with economic theory, that rms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist.

Contracting on litigation

Two risk‐averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third‐party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk‐neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction‐cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149242/1/rand12274.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/149242/2/rand12274_am.pd